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The Right of an Unmarried Cohabitant to
an Action for Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress in California

One who negligently causes a disablinginjury to an adult may also
reasonablyexpect in our contemporarysociety that the injuredperson may be cohabitingwith anotherwithout benefit ofmarriage.1

During the last two decades, American society has experienced social
changes that have altered the traditional family unit.2 In particular, the

number of people who choose to cohabit without the formality of marriage has increased dramatically The California Legislature and judici-

ary have attempted to resolve the legal issues surrounding these
relationships in the fields of housing,4 credit,5 family relations,6 and contracts7 by granting unmarried cohabitants the equivalent legal rights pro-

vided married couples.8 In California, however, a cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress has not been extended to unmarried cohabitants.
The main reason for denying unmarried cohabitants an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress is ajudicial determination that a defendant's liability should be limited to foreseeable plaintiffs.9 A
1.
Rptr. 503,
2.
3.

Butcher v. Superior Court of Orange County, 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 68, 188 Cal.
510(1983).
See infranotes 135-54 and accompanying text.
Approximately 1,560,000 unmarried couples share a household. This figure

represents a 200% increase since 1970. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS SERIES P-20,

No. 365, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1980, at 4-5 (1981).
4. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12955(d). See generally Atkinsson v. Kern County
Hous. Auth., 59 Cal. App. 3d 89,96-98, 130 Cal. Rptr. 375,379-81 (1976).
5. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §23955(e).
6. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§7000-7021 (Uniform Parentage Act).
7. See Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660,557 P.2d 106,134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
8. See generallyComment, Loss of Consortiumand UnmarriedCohabitors:An Examinationof Tong v. Jocson, 14 U.S.F.L. REV. 133, 139-42 (1980).
9. See infra notes 67-101 and accompanying text. For purposes of this comment
the term "emotional distress" or "mental distress" encompasses the following definition:
[M]ental anguish: When connected with a physical injury, this term includes both
the resultant mental sensation of pain and also the accompanying feelings of distress, fright, and anxiety. In other connections, and as a ground for divorce or for
damages or an element of damages, it includes the mental suffering resulting from
the excitation of the more poignant and painful emotions, such as grief, severe disappointment, indignation, wounded pride, shame, public humiliation, despair, etc.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).
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bystander"° who suffers emotional distress from observing another's physical injury by a negligent tortfeasor must share a sufficiently close relationship with theprimary victim t" to come within the definition of a
foreseeable plaintiff. 2 The judicial requirement of a sufficiently close relationship between the bystanderplaintiffandtheprimaryvictim has been
held to be absent when the bystander is the housemate13 of the other in-

jured party.4 On the other hand, the requirement of a sufficiently close relationship has been satisfied when the bystander plaintiff has proved the
existence of a spousal 5 or blood relationship 16 with the primary victim.
The California Supreme Court has yet to determine specifically whether
unmarried cohabitants have a right to state a cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. The possibility ofjudicial extension of the
negligent infliction of emotional distress remedy to unmarried cohabitants, therefore, has not been foreclosed.
Recently, a California court of appeal recognized the right of an unmarried cohabitant to sue for loss of consortium 7 when her housemate of
eleven and one-half years was negligently injured by a motorist. 8 Prior to
that case, the right to state a cause of action for loss of consortium was limited to married couples. 19 The court noted that many unmarried cohabi10. This comment uses the terms "bystander" or "bystander plaintiff" to refer to a
person who suffers emotional distress as a result of witnessing, or learning about, an injury
to another.
11. This comment uses the term "primary victim" to refer to the person who is initially injured by the defendant's tortious conduct.
12. SeeDillonv. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d728,740-41,441 P.2d 912,920,69 Cal. Rptr. 72,80
(1968).
13. This comment uses the term "housemate" or "unmarried cohabitant" to refer
to a person, regardless of his or her sexual preference, who chooses to share a spousal relationship without the formality of a legally recognized marriage ceremony. Underlying
motivations for adopting this lifestyle include (1) a desire to avoid the sex-stereotyped allocation of roles associated with marriage; (2) a belief that marriage is unnecessary or irrelevant if no children are involved; (3) a reluctance to enter a supposedly permanent marriage;
(4) a bohemian philosophy; (5) a conscientious objection to state regulation of marriage;
(6) a desire to avoid the possible expense and trauma of a divorce; (7) an indifferent outlook
on legally sanctioned relationships; and (8) legal obstacles preventing marriage as in the
case of same-sex marriages. See Meade, Consortium Rights of the Unmarried:Time for a
Reappraisal,15 FAM. L. Q. 223,233 (1981-82).
14. See, e.g., Drew v. Drake, 110 Cal. App. 3d 555,168 Cal. Rptr. 65(1980).
15. Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253,79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).
16. Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59,562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977).
17. Loss of consortium traditionally has been defined as the rights of a spouse to
conjugal felicity. The elements of that felicity include love, companionship, affection, society, comfort, solace, sexual relations, and services. See Comment, supranote 8, at 135.
18. Butcher,139 Cal. App. 3d at 58,188 Cal. Rptr. at 503(1983).
19. The right of a married woman to recover for loss of consortium resulting from
injuries to her husband was first recognized in Rodriquez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal.
3d 382,525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974). Subsequent cases, however, refused to expand the cause of action. See Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858,
138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977) (denying relief to the child of an injured parent); Baxter v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 461,563 P.2d 871, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977) (denying relief to the parent of an injured child); Tong v. Jocson, 76 Cal. App. 3d 603, 142 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1977)
(denying relief to the fiancee of an injured man). See also Etienne v. DKM Enterprises, Inc.,
136 Cal. App. 3d 487, 186 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1982) (denying relief to fiancee of an injured
man); Liedingv. Commercial Diving Center, 143 Cal. App. 3d 72, 191 Cal. Rptr. 559(1983)
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tants share a relationship which possesses every characteristic of the

spousal relationship except formalization and thus, when one of the cohabitants is injured, the other partner is deserving of relief." The suffering

of an unmarried cohabitant may be no less real in a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress than in a cause of action for loss of

consortium. In either case, one cohabitant suffers emotional trauma because of the serious injury or death of the other cohabitant.2'

Decisions that premise recovery for negligent infliction of emotional
distress on the presence of a familial relationship between the bystander
plaintiff and the primary victim may produce harsh results.2" This author

will argue that the California judiciary should expand the definition of a
"sufficiently close relationship" to include spousal-like cohabitation rela-

tionships, and thereby recognize a cause of action for negligent infliction
of emotional distress for unmarried cohabitants. An overview of the tort

of negligent infliction of emotional distress first will be presented. This
overview will include a discussion of social policy concerns which limit a
plaintiff's right to relief, an analysis of the types of situations in which a
defendant will be held liable for emotional distress, and the application of
appropriate foreseeability standards to each of those situations. Argu-

ments then will be presented for the extension of the negligent infliction of
emotional distress action to unmarried cohabitants. An analysis of Dillon
v. Legg23 and Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals4 will demonstrate

that the California Supreme Court has not precluded unmarried cohabitants from maintaining an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. An analogy then will be drawn between a plaintiff's cause of action
for loss of consortium and an action for negligent infliction of emotional
(distinguishing Butcher); Hendrix v. General Motors Corp., 146 Cal. App. 3d 296, 193 Cal.
Rptr. 922 (1983) (rejecting Butcher's recognition of an unmarried cohabitant's right to a
loss of consortium action).
Two federal district courts purporting to predict how the state courts would rule permitted a cause of action for loss of consortium by a plaintiff who was not married at the time
of the accident. See Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J. 1980); Sutherland
v. Auch Inter-Borough Transit Company, 366 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Two subsequent New Jersey cases declined to follow Bulloch. See Childers v. Shannon, 444 A.2d 1141
(N.J. Super. 1982); Leonardis v. Morton Chemical Co., 445 A.2d 45 (N.J. Super. 1982). The
Sutherlandcasehas been criticized because of its failure to follow earlier Pennsylvania state
court decisions. See Sostock v. Reiss, 415 N.E.2d 1094 (Ill. App. 1980); Sawyer v. Bailey,
413 A.2d 165 (Me. 1980); see als6 Wagner v. International Harvester Co., 445 F. Supp. 168
(D. Minn. 1978); Childers,444 A.2d 1141. With the exception of Butcher, no other state
court has allowed an unmarried cohabitant to state a claim for loss of consortium. See
Tremblay v. Carter, 390 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 1980); Laws v. Griep, 332 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa
1983); Angeletv. Shivar, 602 S.W.2d 185 (Ken. 1980); Sostock,415 N.E.2d at 1094; Sawyer,
413 A.2d 165; Childers,444 A.2d at 1141; Leonardis,445 A.2d 45; Rademacher v. Torbensen, 13 N.Y.S.2d 124 (N.Y. App. 1939); Booth v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 87 S.E. 84 (W. Va.
1915).
20. See Butcher, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 68, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 510-11.
21. See infranotes 199-203 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Drew, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 555, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 65.
23. 68 Cal. 2d 728,441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
24. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
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distress. This comparison will show that social policy issues concerning
the expansion of each cause of action to include unmarried cohabitants
are similar. The discussion will continue with an analysis of the recent
California appellate court decisions of Butcherv. SuperiorCourtof Orange
County25 and Hendrix v. GeneralMotors Corp.26 These two decisions represent a split of authority over the rights of unmarried cohabitants to a
claim for loss of consortium. A careful appraisal of the two cases will indicate that the debate over the scope of a defendant's duty presented in
Butcher and Hendrix also exists in the field of negligent infliction of emotional distress. The author will conclude that the arguments in Butcher
favoring the extension of a remedy for loss of consortium to unmarried cohabitants support the thesis that unmarried cohabitants should be able to
recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
This comment also will propose that homosexual couples 27 be included
within the definitional framework of unmarried cohabitants. A couple's
sexual preference does not preclude the couple from forming a sufficiently
close relationship even though state legislatures refuse to recognize samesex marriages.28 Homosexual couples who can prove a relationship equivalent to a spousal relationship should be able to maintain a cause of action
for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The following section briefly
will trace the development of the social policies and the law governing liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A.

SocialPolicy Concerns

Courts grant recovery for mental distress when the injury to the plain29
tiff stems from a defendant's intentional or extremely reckless conduct.
Recovery also is available in the form of parasitic damages when the defendant commits a tort such as battery, slander, or false imprisonment,
which causes mental injury to the plaintiff.30 Courts, however, initially
25.
26.
27.

133 Cal. App. 3d 58, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1983).
146 Cal. App. 3d 296, 193 Cal. Rptr. 922 (1983).
"[H]omosexual: One, especially a male, whose desire for sexual relations is di-

rected to a person of the same sex." BALLENTINE'S LAw DICTIONARY 566 (3d ed. 1969).
"[H]omosexuality: atypical sexuality characterized by manifestations of sexual desire toward a member of one's own sex." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

1085 (1976). The term "homosexual couple" or "homosexual cohabitants" as used in this
comment will apply to persons of both sexes.
28.

29.

See infranote 255 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d

282 (1952); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46 commentj (1965).

30.

Rodriques v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 519 (Hawaii 1970); see also RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS §47 comment b (1965).
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were reluctant to recognize that individuals have a duty not to disrupt
negligently the emotional tranquility of others."
Judicial reluctance to recognize the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress was based on three main social policy concerns.3 2 First,
courts were hesitant to grant relief for emotional distress because the injury seemed too speculative to be capable of measurement.3 3 Subsequent
advancements in the field of psychology have sufficiently established that
emotional distress is a real and measurable injury. 34 Second, thejudiciary
was concerned that the courts would be flooded with fictitious claims if a
remedy for negligent infliction of emotional distress were recognized.35
The floodgate theory prompted the third concern of exposing defendants
to potentially unlimited liability. 36 Subsequent court decisions have criticized the barring of all actions for negligent infliction of emotional dis37
tress out of the fear that some fraudulent claims might escape detection.
The decisions of these courts hold that the interests of a meritorious claim
should prevail over alleged administrative difficulties. 8 To allay concerns
about the scope of the defendant's duty, courts have formulated various
tests by which the defendant's liability could be limited. 39 California appears to have adopted two rules that define the scope of a defendant's duty
for negligent infliction of emotional distress.' To clarify the issues involved in the application of these rules, the situations in which a defendant will be liable for mental injury must be distinguished.41
B. Situations Creatingan Actionfor Negligent Infliction ofEmotional
Distress

A defendant's tortious conduct will give rise to a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress in two types of situations. The first
involves a situation in which the defendant's negligent conduct may subject other persons to a risk of physical harm. The persons subjected to or
witnessing the physical harm consequently may suffer serious mental dis31.

See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 327 (4th ed.

1971).
32. Id
33. Id. at 329.
34. Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917,933, 122 Cal. Rptr.
470,481 (1975); PROSSER, supranote 31, at 328.

35. See id.
36. See Jarchow,48 Cal. App. 3d at 934,122 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
37. See id; Tobinv. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419,422 (N.Y. 1969).
38. Dillon, 68 Cal. App. 3d at 736, 441 P.2d at 917-18, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78. See
generallyPROSSER, supranote 31, at 327-28.
39. See infranotes 50-78 and accompanying text.
40. See infranotes 67-97 and accompanying text.
41. See Comment, Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals: CaliforniaExpandsLiabilityforNegligently Inflicted EmotionalDistress,33 HASTINGS L.J. 291,293 (1981).
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tress and accompanying physical injury.42 An example of this situation is
a negligent motorist whose careless operation of an automobile places
others in fear for their own safety or the safety of an accompanying family
43
member.
A defendant also may be liable for negligent infliction of emotional distress when his conduct primarily creates a risk of causing mental harm.
The plaintiff in this second situation is neither subjected to a threat of
physical harm, nor a witness to another's injury although physical symptoms may result from the mental harm inflicted by the defendant. This situation is exemplified by a physician's negligent misdiagnosis of syphilis
which causes the patient and his or her spouse to suspect each other's infi44
delity and to suffer emotional distress as a result of the suspicions.
The distinction between physical risk and mental risk situations is important because the courts have applied different criteria in assessing the
defendant's liability depending upon the situation creating the harm.45
The following section will discuss the applicable laws for determining liability in a physical risk and a mental risk situation. In keeping with the focus of th comment, the discussion will be limited to a defendant's duty to
a plaintiff who has suffered emotional harm arising from witnessing or
learning about an injury to another party.
C. Determiningthe Defendant'sDuty in a PhysicalRisk Situation

Traditionally, courts have been more reluctant to allow a plaintiff a
remedy for emotional distress that arises out of a defendant's tortious
conduct toward another person than in situations in which the plaintiff
alone is injured. 4' Judicial concern over fictitious claims of emotional distress and unlimited liability is even greater when the plaintiff is not the
primary victim of the defendant's negligent conduct.47 To guarantee the
genuineness of the plaintiff's emotional distress claim, most courts require that the plaintiff prove the emotional harm was accompanied by, or
produced, a physical illness or an injury. 48 One of two standards of recov42. Physical injuries may result either from a force set in motion by the defendant
or as a consequence of the mental distress. Id at 293 n. 17.
43. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728,441 P.2d 912,69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
44. See, e.g., Molienv. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916,616 P.2d 813,167 Cal.
Rptr. 831 (1980).
45. See Comment, supranote 41, at 293.
46. See Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel and Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295,314-15,379 P.2d
513,524-25,29 Cal. Rptr. 33,44-45 (1963).

47. Idt
48. Some courts have granted a remedy for physical illness or injury caused by a defendant's conduct which resulted in an impact upon the plaintiff that had no real relation to
the emotional injury. See Porter v. Delaware L. & W.R. Co., 63 A. 860 (N.J. 1906) (dust in
eyes); Morton v. Stack, 170 N.E. 869 (Ohio 1930) (inhalation of smoke); Hess v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 56 A.2d 89 (Pa. 1948) (electronic shock).
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ery is employed by a majority of jurisdictions: the impact rule49 or the

zone of danger rule. California and a few other states have rejected both
of these standards because the rules often produced anomalous results.

1

1.. The Impact Rule

In claims of emotional distress resulting from physical harm to another
person, the plaintiff typically is a bystander-witness to an accident. A mi-

nority of jurisdictions requires that the plaintiff not only prove the existence of a physical injury, but that the defendant's negligent conduct
caused a physical impact to the plaintiff.5 " Courts adhering to this standard of recovery justify the rule on the theory that the plaintiff's claim is
more likely to be valid when impact occurs than when it does not. 3 Critics
of the impact rule assert that while the rule may bejustified when a serious
impact occurs, little guarantee of genuineness exists when the impact is insignificant.54 The majority of jurisdictions rejects the impact rule and
adopts a standard of recovery that provides a remedy when the defendant
49. The followingjurisdictions allow recovery under the impact rule: Arizona: Valley Natl Bank v. Brown, 517 P.2d 1256, 1261 (1974); Arkansas: St. Louis, I.M. & S.R.1R v.
Bragg, 64 S.W. 226,226-27 (1901); Florida: Butchikas v. Travelers Indem. Co., 343 So. 2d
816,819 (1977); Illinois: Braun v. Craven, 51 N.E. 657,659 (1898); Indiana: Kalen v. Terre
Haute & I.1R., 47 N.E. 694,695 (1897); Kentucky: Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v.
Roman's Guardian, 23 S.W.2d 272,275 (1929); Nevada: Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Nolton,
71 P.2d 1051, 1056 (1937); Ohio: Heid v. Red Malcuit Inc., 230 N.E. 2d 674,676 (1967).
50. The following jurisdictions allow recovery under the zone of danger rule. Some
of the jurisdictions listed below refer to the rule as the manifest injury rule: Colorado:
Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163,1164-65 (1978); Delaware: Robbv. Pennsylvania R.R.,
210 A.2d 709, 714-15 (1965); Georgia: Williamson v. Central Ga. Ry., 56 S.E. 119, 122
(1906); Idaho: Summers v. Western Idaho Potato Processing Co., 479 P.2d 292,293 (1970);
Iowa: Watson v. Dilts, 89 N.W. 1068, 1069 (1902); Kansas: Whitsel v. Watts, 159 P. 401,
402 (1916); Maryland: Mahnke v. Moore, 77 A.2d 923, 926-27 (1951); Minnesota: Purcell
v. St. Paul City Ry., 50 N.W. 1034, 1034 (1892); Mississippi: First Nat'l Bank v. Langley,
314 So. 2d 324,339 (Miss. 1975); Montana: Cashin v. Northern Pac. Ry., 28 P.2d 862,86566 (1934); Nebraska: Hanford v. Omaha & C.B. St. Ry., 203 N.W. 643,649-50 (1925); New
Jersey: Falzone v. Busch, 214 A.2d 12, 17 (1965); New Mexico: Higgins v. Hermes, 552
P.2d 1227, 1229 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 558 P.2d 620 (1976); New York: Battalla v. State,
176 N.E.2d 729, 730 (1961); North Carolina: Kimberly v. Howland, 55 S.E. 778, 780-81
(1906); North Dakota: Wilsonv. Northern Pac. Ry., 153 N.W. 429,431 (1915); Oklahoma:
St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. Keiffer, 150 P. 1026, 1028 (1915); Oregon: Salmi v. Columbia &
N.R.., 146 P. 819, 821 (1915); South Carolina: Turner v. ABC Jalousie Co., 160 S.E.2d
528,530 (1968); South Dakota: Sternhagen v. Kozel, 167 N.W. 398,399 (1918); Tennessee:
Trent v. Barrows, 397 S.W.2d 409,411 (1965); Vermont: Savard v. Codey Chevrolet, Inc.,
234 A.2d 656,660 (1967); West Virginia: Lambert v. Brewster, 125 S.E. 244,249-50 (1924);
Wisconsin: Waube v. Warrington, 258 N.W. 497,501 (1935).
51. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728,441 P.2d 912,69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). Otherjurisdictions following the lead of California are: Connecticut: D'Amicol v. Alverez Shipping
Co., 32 A.2d 129 (1973); Hawaii: Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 728 (1974); Massachusetts:
Dzionski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978); Michigan: Toms v. McConnell, 207
N.W.2d 140 (1973); New Hampshire: Corso v. Merrill, 406 A.2d 300 (1979); Pennsylvania:
Sinn v. Burd, 404A.2d 672 (1979); Rhode Island: D'Ambra v. United States, 338 A.2d 524
(1975); Texas: Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Virginia: Hughes
v. Moore, 197 S.E.2d 214 (1973); Washington: Hunsley v. Giard, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976).
52. See supranote 49 and accompanying text.
53. PROSSER,supranote 31, at 331.
54. See supranote 48 and accompanying text.
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subjects the plaintiff to a high risk of physical impact.55
2.

The Zone of DangerRule

The zone of danger rule expands the types of situations in which a
plaintiff may recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress.56 According to this theory of recovery, a defendant is liable to those plaintiffs
close enough in proximity to the defendant's tortious conduct reasonably
to fear injury, if those plaintiffs actually suffer some form of physical
symptom from this fear.57 Courts adopting the zone of danger rule realize
that the plaintiffs emotional distress can result from a fear for his or her
own personal safety as well as from a physical impact.5 8 The zone of danger rule, however, has led to harsh results. InAmaya v. Home Ice, Fueland
Supply Co.,59 a mother witnessed a truck run over her child, but was denied
recovery because, at the time of the accident, the mother was not in fear
for her own life.6" Realizing that mental distress resulting from witnessing
the injury of a close relative might be as valid as that occurring from fear
for personal safety, the California Supreme Court rejected the zone of
61
danger rule.
3. Dillon v. Legg
In Dillon v. Legg,62 the California Supreme Court extended the defen63
dant's liability beyond the limits established in the zone of danger rule.
The Dillon plaintiff-mother suffered a physical injury resulting from the
emotional trauma of witnessing the defendant negligently kill her daughter.' Despite the mother's physical injury, the trial court found the defendant not liable for the mother's emotional distress because the woman was
not in danger of physical harm at the time of the accident. 65 In reversing
the lower court, the California Supreme Court reasoned that both the impact rule and zone of danger rule established artificial standards for assessing a defendant's liability.' The salient point in determining the scope
55.

56.
57.
Cal. Rptr.
58.
59.

39.

60.

See supranote 50 and accompanying text.

See infranotes 57-58 and accompanying text.
See Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29
33 (1963).
I1
59 Cal. 2d 295,379 P.2d 513,29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).

See i at 298-302,304-06,379 P.2d at 514-16,518-19,29 Cal. Rptr. at 34-36,38-

61.

See Dillon,68 Cal. 2d at 733,441 P.2d at 915-16,69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.

62.
63.
64.

68 Cal. 2d 728,441 P.2d 912,69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
See infranotes 66-78 and accompanying text.
See Dillonat 732,441 P.2d at 914,69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.

65.
66.

See iL at 732,441 P.2d at 915,69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
See id at 746-47,441 P.2d at 925,69 Cal. Rptr. at 84-85.
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of a defendant's duty of due care to others is the foreseeability of the risk
of harm from the defendant's negligent act.' Reviewing the facts in Dillon, the court found that the defendant reasonably should have foreseen
that an infant would be accompanied by a parent and that the parent
would suffer emotional distress upon seeing the child killed. 8
In order to prevent the defendant from being exposed to unlimited liability to those persons who might suffer emotional and physical harm
from observing the defendant's tortious conduct, the California Supreme
Court set forth guidelines to assist courts in determining the scope of the
defendant's liability. 69 The Dillon court considered three factors relevant
in determining whether the risk of emotional distress to a bystander plaintiff is foreseeable: (1)whether the plaintiff is located near the scene of the
accident, (2) whether the plaintiff's emotional distress manifested by a
physical injury results from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, and (3) whether the plaintiff and the victim are
closely related.7" The Dillon decision indicates that these guidelines are
not to be applied rigidly.7 1 The court cautioned that future determinations
of a defendant's duty will have to be decided on a case-by-case basis.72 All
the circumstances must be analyzed before a court can conclude what the
ordinary person in a similar situation reasonably should have foreseen. 3
The criteria for determining a defendant's liability under the Dillon rule
apply to situations involving primarily a physical risk.74 A defendant who
negligently subjects another to a threat of mental distress devoid of physical risk is held liable under a different standard. 75 The following section
will discuss the applicable laws for determining the scope of a defendant's
duty in a mental risk situation.
D. Determiningthe Defendant'sDuty in a Mental Risk Situation
Most courts deny recovery for emotional distress in situations in which
the defendant's conduct primarily creates a risk of causing mental harm
because of the inherent difficulties in proving the validity of the claim.7 6
Courts have allowed recovery, however, for mental distress absent a phys-

67.
68.
69.
70.

See id at 740-41,441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81.
Seeid at 741, 441 P.2d at 921,69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
See id at 740-41,441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
See id

71.

See id at740-41, 441 P.2d at920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See id
See id
See id at 740,441 P.2d at 920,69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
See infranotes 87-95 and accompanying text.
See PROSSER, supranote 31, at 328-30.
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ical injury when a telegram has been negligently transmitted" or a corpse
has been negligently handled." The uniquely tragic circumstances of each
situation serve as a guarantee that the claim for emotional distress is valid
79
without the proof of an accompanying physical injury.
In Molien v. Kaiser FoundationHospitals,80 the California Supreme

Court joined the few jurisdictions that have recognized an independent
cause of action for negligent infliction of serious emotional distress absent
the presence of a physical injury.8" The plaintiff husband in Molien
brought an action against a hospital and a doctor, alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress after his wife had been misdiagnosed as having contracted syphilis.82 Mr. Molien alleged that his wife was instructed
to inform him of the diagnosis so that he could undergo blood tests to ascertain whether he also had syphilis and was the source of his wife's purported infection.83 The incident led to marital discord and the initiation of
dissolution proceedings. 84 The trial court dismissed the cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress because the husband did not suffer a physical injury. 5 He also was not present during his wife's examination and, therefore, did not come within the definition of a foreseeable
bystander plaintiff according to Dillon.86 The California Supreme Court
reversed the dismissal on the grounds that Mr. Molien was not a bystander plaintiff but a direct victim of the defendant's negligent conduct.8
An erroneous diagnosis of syphilis, the court reasoned, foreseeably would
cause marital discord. 88 Since the negligent conduct was directed at Mr.
Molien as well as his wife, the doctor had a duty to use care in his diagnosis
77.

See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Crumpton, 36 So. 517 (1903); Western Union

Tel. Co. v. Redding, 129 So. 743 (1930).
78. SeeCheliniv.Niere, 32 Cal. 2d480,196 P.2d 915(1948); Careyv.Lima, Salmon
& Tully Mortuary, 168 Cal. App. 2d 42, 335 P.2d 181 (1959).

79.
330.

See Rodriques v. State, 472 P.2d 509 (1970); see also PROSSEM, supranote 31, at

80. 27 Cal. 3d 916,616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
81. Thesejurisdictions are: California: Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d
916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1980); Hawaii: Rodriques v. State, 472 P.2d 509
(1970); Maine: Culburt v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (1982). Five other
states now recognize negligent infliction of emotional distress as an independent tort.
These jurisdictions are: Alabama: Taylor v. Baptist Medical Center, Inc., 400 So. 2d 369
(1981); Connecticut: Montinieri v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 398 A.2d 1180 (1978);
Louisiana: Chappetta v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 415 So. 2d 1019 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Missouri: Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765 (1983); Washington: Hunsleyv. Giard, 553 P.2d

1096(1976).
82. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 919,616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832. The husband
also alleged loss of consortium. The trial court dismissed plaintiff's action for negligent infliction of emotional distress but failed to dismiss the action for loss of consortium. The
California Supreme Court considered this an oversight and amended the dismissal to apply
to both causes of action. Id at 921,616 P.2d at 815, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
83. Id. at 919,616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
84. Id at 920,616 P.2d at 815, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
85. Seeid
86. See id at 921-23,616 P.2d at 815-17,167 Cal. Rptr. at 833-35.
87. See id at 922-23,616 P.2d at 816,167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
88. See id at 923,616 P.2d at 817,167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
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of the plaintiff's wife.89

Application of the Dillon foreseeability guidelines, ,consequently, appears to limit a defendant's liability only to percipient witnesses in a physical risk situation after Molien.90 In a mental risk situation, the court
applies general principles of foreseeability to limit a defendant's liability.91 The duty to refrain from the negligent infliction of emotional distress is breached when a reasonable person would be unable to cope with
the serious mental stress engendered by the circumstances. 92 The standard of recovery under Molien is based on determinations (1) whether the
defendant owes plaintiff a duty of due care because the plaintiff's injury
reasonably was foreseeable to the defendant, (2) whether the plaintiff suffered serious emotional distress as a result of the defendant's tortious conduct, and (3) whether the plaintiff can produce evidence of a medically
significant nature indicating serious emotional distress, or can establish
"some guarantee of genuineness in the circumstances of the case." 93
As revealed in the above section, California is one of a fewjurisdictions
that recognize an independent cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress absent a physical injury. 94 According to Molien, the
plaintiff will have to prove the defendant breached his duty by applying
general rules of foreseeability. 95 In addition, the plaintiff will have to establish the presence of serious emotional distress by producing evidence
of a significant medical nature or by proving the genuineness in the circumstances of the case.96 The following section will analyze Dillon and
Molien and conclude that unmarried cohabitants are not precluded from
being considered foreseeable plaintiffs in either a physical risk or a mental
risk situation.
EXTENDING THE SCOPE OF DEFENDANT'S DUTY TO UNMARRIED
COHABITANTS
A.

Dillon v. Legg: The PhysicalRisk Situation

As previously noted, a percipient witness to another's injury in a physical risk situation must come within the definition of a foreseeable plaintiff
to recover for emotional distress. 97 Since the Molien decision did not over89.

See ia

90.

See id. at 921-23,616 P.2d at 815-17,167 Cal. Rptr. at 833-35.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Seeid. at 923, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
Seeid. at 928, 616 P.2d at 819-20,167 Cal Rptr. at 837-38.
See Comment, supranote 41, at 300-01.
See supranote 81 and accompanying text.
Seesupranote 91 and accompanying text.
See Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 930,616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
See supranotes 68-69 and accompanying text.
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rule Dillon,98 a bystander plaintiff will have to prove the defendant's duty
of due care according to the Dillon foreseeability guidelines. The factors
relevant in determining whether the risk of emotional distress to a bystander plaintiff is reasonably foreseeable are: (1) whether the plaintiff is
located near the scene of the accident, (2) whether plaintiff's emotional
distress results from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the
accident, and (3) whether the plaintiff and the victim are closely related. 99
In addition, the plaintiff may also have to prove that the emotional distress resulted in a physical injury since Molien abolished the physical injury requirement only when the plaintiff was defined as a directvictim.1M
Implicit in the Dillon decision is the mandate of the court that the foreseeability guidelines be applied on a case-by-case basis.' This language
implies that the court wanted to avoid setting forth a rigid standard for determining a defendant's duty to bystander plaintiffs. 102 The court cautioned, however, that the defendant's liability should not extend to the
"remote and unexpected." 0 3 Recognizing that a liberal application of the
Dillon factors would subject the defendant to unlimited liability, subsequent decisions by the California courts of appeal have granted recovery
only when all three Dillon factors are present.'14
An unmarried cohabitant who witnesses the injury of his or her housemate, therefore, would have to comply with the three-pronged test set
forth in Dillon."5 In particular, the cohabitant would have to prove the existence of a close relationship with the primary victim. One California
court of appeal has refused to grant the Dillon close relationship status to
cohabitants.0 6
0 7 the plaintiff alleged
In Drew v. Drake,"
that she suffered emotional
distress upon observing her "de facto"'0 8 spouse of three years killed in an
automobile collision negligently caused by the defendant." 9 The Drew
court denied recovery on the grounds that the bystander plaintiff and pri98.
99.

Seesupranote 90 and accompanying text.
See supranote 70 and accompanying text.

100. See Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 928,616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
101. Seesupranotes 71-73 and accompanying text.
102. Mat
103. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at741,441 P.2d at 921,69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
104. See Arauz v. Gerhardt, 68 Cal. App. 3d 937, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1977); Powers
v. Sissoev, 39 Cal. App. 3d 865,114 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1974). Followingjurisdictions that have
interpreted the first twoDillonfactors narrowly, two recent Califorma appellate court decisions have construed the Dillon close relationship factor strictly. See Kately v. Wilkinson,
148 Cal. App. 3d 576, 195 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1983) (relationship akin to family relationship because of friendship and past associations does not satisfy third Dillon factor); Trapp v.
Schuyler Constructions dba Regent Apts. 149 Cal. App. 3d 1140, 197 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1983)
(refusing to extend the third Dillon factor to include first cousins).

105.
106.

See supranote 70 and accompanying text.
See Drew v. Drake, 110 Cal. App. 3d 555,168 Cal. Rptr. 65(1980).

107.

lod

108.

Id at 557,168 Cal. Rptr. 65.

109.

ld
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mary victim did not satisfy the close relationship requirement set forth in
Dillon.1"' Noting that spousal' and parental"' relationships have been
held to satisfy the Dillon guideline, Drew refused to provide relief to a
plaintiff who did not share a familial bond with the primary victim. 13 The
court reasoned that allowing cohabitants to recover would be an unreasonable extension of the defendant's scope of duty and contrary to the in114
tent expressed in Dillon.
The Drew decision unnecessarily limits recovery to those bystander
plaintiffs who share a spousal or blood relationship with the primary victim,1 15 despite the clear recommendation of the Dillon court that the criteria for establishing foreseeability be applied on a case-by-case basis. 1 6
Depending upon the particular circumstances of each case, Dillon suggests that the foreseeability guidelines might be given different weight and
even replaced with more relevant factors." 7 Furthermore, Dillon does not
precisely define the scope of a sufficiently close relationship.118 The decision indicates only that a bystander who has no relationshipwith the primary victim, or who has only a distantrelationship with that party, will be
unable to recover.119 The court, therefore, only precludes relief for mental
injury to those bystanders who have not formed any real and significant
emotional bond with the primary victim.' This language allows for a degree of flexibility in determining the type of relationship which will satisfy
the Dillon foreseeability close relationship guideline.
Another California appellate court has provided a more flexible interpretation of the close relationship guideline than that found in Drew.121 In
Mobaldi v. Regents of University of California,122 a foster mother was al-

lowed to recover for her emotional distress after observing the defendant
negligently administer a fatal dose of glucose solution to her foster
child. 123 The court found that while the relationship of biological parent
and child did not exist, the emotional bond between Mrs. Mobaldi and
110. Id at 557-58, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 65-66.
11I.
See, e.g., Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863
(1977).
112. See, e.g., Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723
(1969).
113. SeeDrew, 11OCal.App. 3dat558,168 Cal. Rptr. at66.
114. Seeid. at557, 168 Cal. Rptr. at66.
115. Seeid at558,168 Cal. Rptr. at66.
116. See Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740,441 P.2d at 920,69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
117. See id at 741,441 P.2d at 920,69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
118. Seeid
119. Seeid
120. See id
121. See Mobaldi v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr.
720 (1976); accordLeong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758,766 (Hawaii 1974) (recovery by plaintiff for witnessing death of step-grandmother).
122. 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976).
123. Seeid at578, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
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her foster child possessed all the incidents of a parent-child relationship
"except those flowing as a matter of law."' 2 Mobaldifurther noted that
the Dillonguidelines seemingly do not limit the scopeof the close relationship requirement to one of blood, marriage, or adoption. 25 A strong emotional attachment similar to a familial relationship could satisfy the Dillon
guideline. 126 Given the facts of Mobaldi, the court concluded that the
child's foster parents more likely would suffer emotional trauma from observing the boy's injury and death than would the boy's biological parents
27
who had abandoned him. 1
The extension of the defendant's duty of due care to persons who share
a "family like" relationship with the primary victim does not contradict
the foreseeability guideline of Dillon, as the Drew decision implies.128 The
purpose of the close relationship guideline set forth in Dillon is to screen
out insignificant or erroneous claims of emotional distress. 12 9 A familial
relationship is a means of guaranteeing that the distress claimed is real. 3
As Mobaldiindicates, however, the emotional attachments of a family relationship, and not legal status, are the attachments that are relevant to
foreseeability.'"I SinceDillonhas been held to encompass parental-like relationships, 13 2 an argument may be made that the guidelines also should
encompass spousal-like relationships.
An example of a spousal-like relationship is the relationship that is often found to exist between unmarried cohabitants. Particularly if the relationship has been long lasting, an unmarried cohabitant likely will suffer
serious emotional distress from witnessing the injury or death of the other
cohabitant. The dramatic increase in the number of couples choosing to
cohabit certainly removes this type of relationship from what Dillon
termed the remote and unexpected.' 34 In 1980, over 1,500,000 unmarried
heterosexual couples shared a household. 135 This represents a 200% increase since 1970.136 Many cohabitation arrangements closely resemble
the traditional family unit. 37 Twenty-seven percent of the cohabiting
124. See id.
at 583, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 726-27.
125. See idat582, 127 Cal.Rptr.at 726.
126. See id

127. See id
128. SeeDrew, 110 Cal.App.3d at 557,168 Cal.Rptr.at 65-66.

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

SeeDillon, 68 Cal.2d at 741,441 P.2d at 921,69 Cal.Rptr.at 81.
Seeid
Mobaldi,55 Cal. App. 3d at 582, 127 Cal.Rptr. at 716-17.
See id
See Butcher v.Superior Court of Orange County, 139 Cal. App. 58, 67, 188 Cal.

Rptr.503,510 (1983).
134. SeeDillon,68 Cal. 2d at741,441 P.2d at921,69 Cal.Rptr. at 81.
135. Seesupranote 3 and accompanying text.
136. Id
137. See generally Blumberg,Cohabitation Without Marriage:A Different Perspective, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1125, 1128-37 (1981).
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couples in 1980 had children living with them.'38 The few studies that have
exhibit ecbeen made concerning cohabitants indicate that these couples
13 9
persons.
married
with
associated
generally
behavior
onomic
Along with an increase in the number of couples choosing to cohabit, a
marked increase has occurred in the rate of divorce in the United States. 140
Since 1970 the divorce rate has climbed from 47 to 109 divorced persons
per 1,000 married persons.141 Given these profound social changes during
the last two decades, a narrow interpretation of the basic family unit
would not reflect the realities of contemporary society.
In recognition of the changing family structure and increase in spousallike cohabitation, the California Legislature and judiciary have reformed
many laws that discriminated on the basis of marital status.14 Section
12955 of the California Government Code makes discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, ancestry, or maritalstatus illegal. 143 This code section was applied by the California court of appeal in Atkisson v. Kern County HousingAuthority,'" which held that the

statute prohibited unmarried, low-income housing tenants from being
evicted for living with a person of the opposite sex. 145 Section 12955141 also
prohibits financial institutions from using a person's marital status as a
basis in evaluating a credit application. Furthermore, the California Legislature has repealed sections 269a and 269b of the California Penal
Code, 147 which made cohabitation and adultery misdemeanors.
In Marvin v. Marvin,"I the California Supreme Court recognized that
contemporary social mores were changing radically and that unmarried
cohabitants should have access to the legal system to settle their disputes. 149 The Marvin court held that express contracts between unmarried
cohabitants regarding property rights are enforceable. 5 ' A basis for equitable relief in the absence of an express contract also was recognized by
the court. 51
Legal recognition afforded unmarried cohabitants by the Legislature
and the courts reflects the growing awareness and acceptance of alternaSeeid at1129.
Seeidat1139.
140. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS POPULATION CHARACTERISTIC SERIES P-20 No. 372, MARITAL STATUS AND
LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1981 at 1(1982).
141. Id
138.
139.

142.
143.

Seesupra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
Seesupra note4 and accompanying text.

144.
145.

59 Cal. App. 3d 89, 130 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976).
Seeid at96, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 379.

146.
147.

See supranote 4 and accompanying text.
CAL. PENAL CODE §§269a-269b (repealed 1975).

148.

149.
150.
151.

18 Cal. 3d 660,557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).

Id at 683-84, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
Id at 665,557 P.2d at 134, 134 Cal. Rptr. 819.
Id
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tive lifestyles by contemporary society.1 2 Certainly, the values underlying
the interest of the state in marriage are important and universally favored. 5 3 The conclusion that these values only will exist in a legally sanctioned marital framework, however, is doubtful given the rapid changes
occurring in the family unit.' 54
The foregoing analysis of Dillon has noted that one criterion for determining whether a bystander plaintiff is a foreseeable victim of defendant's
negligent act is evidence of a sufficiently close relationship between the
plaintiff and primary victim. 55 Dillon allows courts flexibility in interpreting the scope of the close relationship standard.'5 6 Considering the
prevalence of spousal-like relationships'5 7 and the resulting legal recognition of cohabitant's rights,158 this author proposes that the foreseeability
guidelines of Dillon do not preclude unmarried cohabitants from a remedy for emotional distress in a physical risk situation.
The defendant also should be prevented from claiming an absence of
duty to unmarried cohabitants when defendant's tortious conduct places
the cohabitants primarily in fear of mental harm. In this instance, the defendant's duty will be determined by the foreseeability standards in
Molien. 5 9 The following section will discuss whether unmarried cohabitants are precluded from an emotional distress remedy in a mental risk situation.
B.

Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals: The MentalRisk Situation

In Molien, the California Supreme Court held that a plaintiff can recover for serious emotional distress absent physical harm if the injury was
reasonably foreseeable to the defendant and the plaintiff can prove serious emotional distress by the genuineness of the circumstances or by significant medical evidence. 6° Extending the defendant's duty of due care
to unmarried cohabitants may be accomplished more easily in a mental
risk situation than one in which the risk of physical injury is paramount.
In the physical risk situation, a plaintiff must have suffered a physical in152.
153.

Seesupranotes 142-51 and accompanying text.
SeeMarvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at684,557P.2d at 122,134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.

154.

Seesupranotes 134-41 and accompanying text.

155. See supranote 70 and accompanying text.
156. See supranotes 116-20 and accompanying text.
157. See supranotes 134-39 and accompanying text.
158. See supranotes 142-51 and accompanying text.
159. 27 Cal. 3d 916,616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
160. See supranote 96 and accompanying text. Jurisdictions have differed over the
scope of serious emotional distress. See Campbellv. Animal Quarantine Stations, 632 P.2d

1066 (Hawaii 1981) (allowing recovery for death of dog). But see Roman v. Carroll, 621
P.2d 307 (Ariz. 1980) (denying recovery for death of dog because the court held that the dog

was personal property).
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jury from the emotional distress and also satisfy the foreseeability factors
of Dillon which include the existence of a substantial relational interest
with the primary victim.16' The Molien standard of recovery, however, focuses more on whether the plaintiff actually suffers serious emotional distress' 62 rather than whether the injured plaintiff comes within an artificial
163
definition of a foreseeable victim.
Molien adopts a reasonable person standard to determine the scope of
the defendant's duty of due care.'" The jury must decide whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have foreseen the plaintiffs injury.'65 Social policy concerns for limiting the defendant's liability,
however, still must be considered by the court.1 66 In Molien, the plaintiff
and his wife shared a physician-patient relationship with the defendant
doctor. 67 Similarly, a type of privity also existed between the plaintiffs
and defendants in the telegraph'68 and mortician cases. 169 While Molien
specifically does not require privity between the parties in order to find
that a reasonable person would have foreseen the plaintiff's injury, this requirement would serve the purpose of protecting the defendant from unlimited liability.170
The reasonable person standard also is applicable to plaintiff's burden
of proving injury and causation. 171 The genuineness of an emotional distress claim can be satisfied in two ways. 72 First, the plaintiff can meet the
burden of proving serious emotional injury by producing significant medical evidence verifying the existence of the injury. 73 Second, the plaintiff
may establish the genuineness of the claim by the special circumstances of
the case.174 In evaluating the reasonableness of the plaintiff's reaction and
the genuineness of the plaintiff's proof, thejury may grant relief if thejury
finds that a reasonable person would be unable to cope sufficiently with
the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case. 75 Satisfying either method of proof should not pose an insurmountable task for an
unmarried cohabitant who has been placed in a mental risk situation by a
negligent tortfeasor, especially if the defendant holds a position of trust.
161.

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

See supranote 70 and accompanying text.

See Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 929-30,616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
Seeid
See id at 923,616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
See id
See id at 930,616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
See id at 919-20,616 P.2d at 814-15, 167 Cal. Rptr. 832-33.
See supranote 77 and accompanying text.
See supranote 78 and accompanying text.
See Comment, supranote 41, at 307 n.107.
See Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 930,616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
See id.
Seeid
Seeid
Seeid
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The plaintiff in Molien, who was perceived as a direct victim, recovered
for emotional distress because of a foreseeable disruption of the marital
relationship.176 Similarly, a physician, cognizant of a spousal-like relationship between the patient and another person, reasonably should foresee that a misdiagnosis of syphilis, cancer, or other grave illness would
have a detrimental effect upon both cohabitants.77 Once the defendant's
duty to the unmarried cohabitants is established, the direct victim plaintiff in this situation would have to prove the existence and reasonableness
78
of the mental injury. 1
The previous discussion has demonstrated that neither the Dillon nor
Molien standards of recovery preclude an unmarried cohabitant from
stating a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress when
his or her housemate is injured. Increased social awareness, if not acceptance, of the growing number of couples who choose to cohabit supports
the thesis that courts should not apply outmoded social policy concerns
that deny unmarried cohabitants a remedy in either a physical or mental
risk situation. 179 The following section will detail the social policy concerns regarding the question of whether unmarried cohabitants should be
granted the right to a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. By
way of analogy, the author will present two conflicting opinions on the issue of whether an unmarried cohabitant is entitled to an action for loss of
consortium when his or her partner is seriously injured. The torts of negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium are, in many
ways, similar. A final resolution of the legal conflicts created by the two
cases will affect significantly the rights of unmarried cohabitants in the
area of negligent infliction of emotional distress. 80
Loss OF CONSORTIUM AND NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS

Loss of consortium and negligent infliction of emotional distress are
similar causes of action because each provides the plaintiff with a means
176.

See id at 923,616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.

177.

See Comment, Negligent Infliction of EmotionalDistress: New HorizonsAfter

179.

See supranotes 135-39 and accompanying text.

Mollen v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 13 PAC. L.J. 179,191 n.100 (1981).
178. See supranotes 171-75 and accompanying text.

180. The two conflicting California appellate court cases are: Butcher v. Superior
Court of Orange County, 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1983) and Hendrix v.
General Motors Corporation, et al., 146 Cal. App. 3d 296, 193 Cal. Rptr. 922 (1983). The
appellant in the Hendrix case filed an appeal after the adverse judgment. The California
Supreme Court granted a hearing in October 1983, but subsequently dismissed the appeal
on January 7, 1984, per stipulation after the parties in Hendrix agreed to an out-of-court
settlement. A resolution of the issue of whether unmarried cohabitants have a right to a
cause of action for loss of consortium, consequently, has been postponed.
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of relief for serious emotional injury. 8 ' The social policy arguments
against extending either cause of action to unmarried cohabitants are similar. These arguments include the following: (1) the lack of precedent for
extending the cause of action to unmarried couples, (2) the injury to the
unmarried partner is too indirect, (3) the damages would be too speculative, (4) the cause of action would be extended to other classes of plaintiffs, and (5) public policy favors marriage. 182 The following section will
analyze a case which discredits these concerns and concludes that unmarried couples have a right to a loss of consortium action.
A.

Butcher v. Superior Court of Orange County
A California appellate court in Butcher v. Superior Court of Orange

County, 83 recently held that none of the social policy concerns, as applied
to a loss of consortium action, outweighed the need for the defendant to.
redress the wrong perpetrated against the plaintiff.184 In Butcher, the
plaintiff's cohabitant of eleven and one-half years was negligently struck
by the defendant's car and seriously injured.185 At the time of the accident,
the unmarried couple had two children, filedj oint income tax returns, and
maintainedjoint savings and checking accounts.186 The couple referred to
and acknowledged each other as husband and wife although no legal marriage ceremony had taken place.187 Upon learning that the plaintiffs were
not legally married, the defendant moved for summary judgment on the
claim for loss of consortium.188 The appellate court denied the defendant's
writ of mandate to compel the trial court to grant the motion for summary
judgment.'89
The defendant argued that a claim for loss of consortium could not be
stated by the plaintiff because the right to consortium is based on a legally
valid marriage.9 Furthermore, social policy dictates against expanding
the defendant's liability to unmarried couples. 1 Butcher acknowledged
that social policy had limited recovery for loss of consortium to the legally
married.9 2 The court, however, defined the tort of loss of consortium as
an interference with the continuation of a relational interest and con181.

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

See supranotes 9, 17 and accompanying text.

See Butcher, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 62, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1983).
See id at 62-70, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 506-12.
See id.at 59-60, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 504-05.
Seeid.at60, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
See id.
Seeid.
Seeid.
See id.
See id at62, 188 Cal. Rptr. at506.
Seeid.
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cluded that unmarried cohabitants93also have a legitimate interest in the
continuation of their relationship. 1
In addressing the policy arguments against extending the tort remedy
to unmarried couples, the court initially refuted the theory that no precedent existed for this action. 194 The court noted that the common law is not
a static body of laws, but is capable of adapting to changing times and issues.' 95 The basis for a cause of action for loss of consortium, therefore,
had gradually changed from a proprietary entitlement vested in the husband to one of a relational interest shared equally by both spouses. 196 This
judicial reformation of the tort action reflected the changing perception of
a woman's status in western society. 197 After a review of relevant case law,
the court concluded that no precedent existed that would prevent further
judicial revisions of the tort action to reflect the changing needs of soci98
ety.

1

The second policy argument which stated that the spouse of the physically injured victim suffers too indirect or too remote an injury also was
criticized in Butcher.199 This argument, the court noted, originally was advanced to prevent a wife's cause of action for loss of consortium and has
been widely rejected by the courts.?° A severely disabling injury to one
spouse may not destroy the marital relationship, but the relationship will
invariably be altered in a tragic manner.21 The mental and emotional
anguish caused by observing a spouse turned into a helpless invalid is
neither an indirect nor a remote injury.20 2 Butcher reasoned that the suffering of an unmarried cohabitant in a similar situation may be no less
real, direct, or foreseeable than that suffered by a spouse.2 3
The policy argument stating damages in a loss of consortium action
were too speculative was considered meritless by Butcher.201 Advances in
modem science provide sufficient evidence that a person, regardless of
marital status, may become severely disabled, mentally as well as physically, upon the death or injury of a loved one.205 Modem science has also
developed the ability to approximate the extent of mental suffering.20 6 On
the basis of this information, courts and juries have been able to award
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damages for pain and suffering as well as for other noneconomic losses.2 7
The fourth policy issue concerned the fear that defendants would be exposed to unlimited liability if the tort remedy were extended beyond the
marital relationship. 208 Butcher argued that this fear was unwarranted.20 9
If the unmarried cohabitants could prove a relational interest similar to
that shared by spouses, then the defendant would be liable only to the
210
partner of the physically injured cohabitant.
The final argument involved the concern that if unmarried cohabitants
were allowed loss of consortium, the interest of the state in fostering marriage, as evidenced in the workers' compensation and wrongful death statutes, would be undermined. 2 1'Butcher noted that the right to recover
under each of these laws is governed by statute while a cause of action for
loss of consortium developed out of the common law.212 Since the California Legislature has chosen not to define or regulate consortium rights by
statute, 213 Butcherconcluded that the mandates of both workers' compensation and wrongful death statutes are inapplicable to the cause of action
for loss of consortium.2 4
After holding that the social policy against extending the right to a
cause of action for loss of consortium to unmarried cohabitants is no
longer justified, Butcher provided a standard whereby cohabitation relationships could be evaluated to determine whether a remedy should be afforded.215 Butcher noted that nonmarital cohabitation arrangements are
entered into for a variety of reasons and include relationships that range
from casual affairs to relationships that endure longer than many marriages. 216 Permitting all unmarried cohabitants to recover for loss of consortium, therefore, would pose severe problems in terms of limiting the
defendant's liability.217 Thus, the Butcher court recommended that only
unmarried cohabitants who can prove a stable and significant cohabitation arrangement be included within the definition of a foreseeable plain-
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fected by the injury. If these relationships were recognized, then the defendant's liability
would depend on the number of friends, children, or other relatives an injured person has,
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tiff in a loss of consortium action. 218
The guidelines presented in Butcher for use in evaluating the stability
and significance of a cohabitation arrangement include the following: (1)
the existence of a mutual contract, (2) the degree of economic cooperation
and entanglement, (3) the exclusivity of sexual relations, and (4) the exis219
tence of a "family relationship" with children.
The preceding analysis of Butcher indicates that a person who negligently injures an adult may reasonably foresee in our contemporary society that the injured person may be cohabiting with another without the
formality of marriage. 2" Policy arguments favoring the limitation of a defendant's liability despite the foreseeable injury are no longer valid according to Butcher.221 Finally, the court presents criteria for evaluating
cohabitation arrangements. 22 Proof of these criteria enables the granting
of relief to those couples who have provided evidence of a significantly
close relationship.22 A contrary opinion regarding the right of unmarried
cohabitants to a loss of consortium action will be analyzed in the following section.
B.

Hendrix v. General Motors Corp. et al.
In Hendrix v. General Motors Corp. et al.,224 the plaintiffs, Lebron

Mitchell and Sharon Hendrix, joined in a complaint against General Motors Corporation and Doten Pontiac for damages arising out of an automobile accident in which Mitchell was severely injured. 225 Mitchell stated
three causes of action for products liability and negligence; in the fourth
cause of action, Hendrix alleged loss of consortium. 226 Hendrix alleged
that she was the prospective wife of the plaintiff and had been residing
with Mitchell at the time of the accident. 7 The defendants demurred to
the fourth cause of action on the basis that a claim for loss of consortium
cannot be maintained if the plaintiff is not married to the injured party. 22
The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered ajudgment of dismissal against Hendrix, which was affirmed by the
appellate court. 229
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

224.
225.
226.

227.
228.
229.

See id
Seeid.
Seeid at68,188Cal.Rptr.at510.
Seeid at62-70,188 Cal. Rptr. at506-12.
See supranote 219 and accompanying text.
See Butcher, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 70, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 512.

146 Cal. App. 3d 296, 193 Cal. Rptr. 922 (1983).
See id at 297-98, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 922-23.
See id at 297, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 922-23.

See id at 297,193 Cal. Rptr. at 923.
See id
See id at 297-98, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 922-23.

1984 / UnmarriedCohabitant

Outlining in great detail thejudicial and legislative support for the notion that marriage is the basic unit of social order, the Hendrix court reasoned that this public policy would be thwarted if unmarried cohabitants
could gain marital legal rights without accepting the accompanying legal1
responsibilities." Hendrixsharply disagreed with the Butcherdecision.23
In particular, the Hendrix court advocated that the judiciary not attempt
to affect a change in public policy regarding the rights of cohabitants.
should have
Only the legislature, which is responsible. to the electorate,
2 32
nature.
this
of
changes
radical
institute
to
the power
Another point of contention between the two decisions is the Hendrix
appraisal of the Butcher criteria for establishing evidence of a stable and
significant relationship.233 Hendrix labeled the criteria unworkable.234
While married couples could prove their relationship by documentary evidence, unmarried cohabitants would have to rely on more subjective evidence. 235 Numerous standards and difficulties would arise, placing an
unnecessary burden on thejudicial system. 36
The two appellate court decisions of Butcher and Hendrixobviously are
in sharp disagreement over the issue of whether to extend a remedy for
loss of consortium to unmarried cohabitants.3 7 Butcher emphasizes the
need for the plaintiff to be compensated for the defendant's negligent act,
and holds that the plaintiff is a foreseeable victim who is owed a duty of
due care."8 Hendrix defines the defendant's duty according to prevalent
social policies, which the court refuses to override in order to provide a
remedy for loss of consortium to unmarried cohabitants. 239 The following
section will discuss the applicability of the two decisions to an emotional
distress action.
C. Applicationof Butcher and Hendrix to a Negligent Infliction of
EmotionalDistressAction
This author has indicated that a defendant in either a physical or
mental risk situation owes a duty of care to all persons who foreseeably are
endangered by his tortious conduct. 2' As the Butcher court noted, the
likelihood that an injured adult will be married is no less than the likeli230.
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hood that a small child's mother personally will witness an injury to her
offspring.241 By parity of reasoning, the defendant also reasonably may
expect in our contemporary society that the injured adult may be an unmarried cohabitant and that his or her housemate will suffer emotional
distress by witnessing the injury.
In a physical risk situation, the plaintiff must suffer a physical injury
and satisfy the foreseeability guidelines of Dillon which include the exis242
tence of a substantially close relationship with the primary victim.
Courts that have interpreted Dillon flexibly have allowed recovery for
emotional distress suffered by a plaintiff who shares a "family-like" relationship with the primary victim. "4 A plaintiff who is able to prove the existence of a stable and significant spousal-like relationship with the
primary victim by use of the Butcher criteria should also satisfy the Dillon
requirement of a substantially close relationship.
A close relational interest between the direct victim and other injured
party is not specifically required in a mental risk situation.244 Evidence of
a serious mental injury, however, would be substantiated by proof of a
spousal-like relationship between the two injured parties.245 A defendant
who is in privity with the cohabitants and knows of the spousal-like relationship should reasonably conclude that his negligent conduct could result in plaintiffs injury.24
In either a physical risk or mental risk situation, the defendant's duty of
due care is limited by social policy.247 The Hendrix decision reflects the
opinion of courts that are concerned with a possible flood of fictitious litigation and increasing administrative difficulties.248 If the task of providing unmarried cohabitants a remedy for loss of consortium were given to
the legislature, as the Hendrixdecision suggests, the courts would be abdicating judicial responsibility. Both loss of consortium and negligent infliction of emotional distress actions are derived from common law.2 49
The judiciary, therefore, must use the traditions of common law to con0
struct an appropriate standard of recovery.2
Another concern expressed in Hendrix25 1 is the need to foster the basic
family unit. Granting a remedy to unmarried couples who suffer severe
emotional distress in either a physical or mental risk situation will not un241.
242.
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dermine the interest of the state in fostering the traditional family unit.
Clearly, the transitions taking place in western culture, as exemplified by
the changes in family structure, reflect a moral and social revolution that
will not be halted by ajudiciary insistent on adhering to an older morality.5 Furthermore, unlike the tort of loss of consortium, which is founded
on an interest in a marital relationship, 53 the tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress merely requires that the injured parties share a substantially close relationship.54 Thus, the concern in Hendrix about the interest of the state in protecting marital rights is not as great in an action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress as would be the case in an action
for loss of consortium.
Despite the Hendrix decision, the rationale for extending a loss of consortium cause of action to unmarried cohabitants presented in Butcher
may still be relied upon as support for extending to unmarried cohabitants the right to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Dillon and Molien mandate that fears of administrative difficulties
and fictitious claims should not shield a defendant from liability when a
serious wrong has been committed5 5 Unmarried cohabitants, whose alternative lifestyle serves the same basic function as a familial relationship,
should not be denied legal redress as punishment for refusing to conform
to traditional notions of morality or because the judiciary seeks to avoid
administrative difficulties. A probable result of this conclusion is the legal
recognition of a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim brought
by an unmarried heterosexual cohabitant. A further extension of this theory would be to recognize the same cause of action brought by an unmarried homosexual cohabitant. The following section will present the
application of the foreseeability tests of Dillon and Molien to the homosexual plaintiff in both a physical risk and mental risk situation.
APPLICATION TO HOMOSEXUAL COHABITANTS

The increasing political activism of the homosexual community has resulted in a growing awareness of the legal needs of that community by the
judiciary and the legislatures.5 6 Traditional notions of the family unit
252. See Butcher, 139 Cal. App.3d at 68,188 Cal. Rptr. at 510.
253. Seeid at60, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
254. See Comment, supranote 177, at 201.
255. See Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 736-37, 441 P.2d at 917-18, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78;
Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 925-30,616 P.2d at 818-21,167 Cal. Rptr. at 836-39.
256. See In re Reed, 33 Cal. 3d 914,663 P.2d 216, 191 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1983) (holding
mandatory registration of sex offenders convicted under misdemeanor disorderly conduct
statute violated cruel and unusual punishment provision of California Constitution); Gay
Law Student's Ass'n v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph, 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156
Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979) (holding that the California equal protection clause does not permit
privately owned utilities or the state to arbitrarily discriminate against homosexuals re-
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and lingering prejudice against homosexuals, however, have hampered legal reform in this area.257 Unlike heterosexual couples who may choose
whether to marry, homosexual couples are denied the opportunity to
marry legally by state law. 58 Nevertheless, many of these couples form
stable and significant cohabitation arrangements which serve the same
function as a spousal relationship. 59 This comment suggests that the arguments in favor of extending a cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress to unmarried heterosexual cohabitants also should be
applicable to homosexual cohabitants in a physical risk or mental risk situation.
A.

Recovery in a PhysicalRisk Situation

This author has argued that a spousal-like relationship should qualify
as a close relationship under the Dillon guidelines.2 6 The Butcher court
held that the increasing incidence of unmarried cohabitation in recent
years also increased the chance that a percipient witness to an accident
would be the "de facto" spouse of the primary victim and would suffer
emotional distress as a result.261 Butcher dismissed the social policy arguments limiting the defendant's duty as no longer valid in contemporary
society and outweighed by the need to redress a wrong suffered by the
plaintiff.
The same logic could be applied to a physical risk situation involving a
homosexual couple. In California, the number of homosexual couples
openly living together in a spousal-like relationship has increased substantially in recent years.2 62 While recognition of the legal needs of homosexual couples has been tentative, some courts have granted homosexual
2 63
couples rights in the area of family law.
Marvin v. Marvin, as previously noted, redefined the rights of unmargarding employment); Coleman, The SexualExplosion:A Survey ofJudicialandLegislative
Developments in Sexual Law Duringthe PastDecade,4 SEX. L. RPTR. 21(1978).
257. See Oakes, PerceptionsofHomosexuality by Justicesof the Peace in Colonial Virginia,4 SEx. L. RPrR. 35 (1978); see alsoRivera, OurStraightLacedJudges:The LegalPosilion ofHomosexualPersonsin the UnitedStates,30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979).
258. See Rivera, supranote 257, at 874-78.
259. See id. at 908. An example of the changing attitude of society toward homosexual couples is reflected in the recent California Workers' Compensation Appeals Board decision of Finnerty, Jr., Donovan v. County of Los Angeles, Case No. 73 LA 385-107 (Dec. 5,
1983). The board held that the applicant had established that he was a good faith member
of the decedent's household and a dependent of the decedent. The board further held that a
homosexual relationship does not, in and of itself, bar awarding the applicant death benefits. Id at 1-2 (opinion on file at the PacifcLawJournal.)
260. See supranotes 97-154 and accompanying text.
261. See supranotes 203-23 and accompanyng text.
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at 800 n.4.
263. See id at 874-908.
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ried cohabitants with regard to financial interests in property.2' The decision did not necessarily limit these property rights to unmarried
heterosexual couples. Following the Marvin lead, a subsequent San Diego
superior court decision recognized the relationship of two lesbians as sufficiently legitimate to require one of the women to pay support to the
other when the relationship ended.265 The trial judge based the holding on
the fact that the two women participated in a HolyUnion ceremony at the
Metropolitan Community Church and had signed an agreement that one
would take responsibility for the household and the other for financial
266
support.
In addition to awarding community property rights to homosexuals,
the courts are increasingly granting homosexual parents child custody.267
Custody more frequently is being given to the parent based on the person's parenting abilities rather than on sexual orientation.268 Consistent
with the more tolerant trend in attitudes toward homosexual couples, a
Los Angeles superior court allowed an openly homosexual couple to
adopt a child.2 69 Increased community and legal recognition of homosex-

ual couples tends to support the theory that a homosexual cohabitant is a
foreseeable bystander plaintiff in a physical risk situation.
Consequently, thejudiciary should not bar a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress by a homosexual couple able to prove the existence of a stable and significant relationship by applying the factors
presented in Butcher.271 Since Molien does not specifically require a close
relationship, 272 recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress may
be more easily obtained for a homosexual cohabitant in a mental risk situation.
B.

Recovery in a MentalRisk Situation

A medical misdiagnosis of syphilis could have a detrimental effect on
most couples regardless of their marital status or sexual preference. As
previously suggested, the Molien standard for recovery should not be confined to a situation in which the marital interests alone arejeopardized.27 3
A misdiagnosis of a serious or terminal disease might produce similar neg264.
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ative repercussions between two persons sharing a close relationship.
A tragic misdiagnosis of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome2 74 or
the negligent treatment of a homosexual patient with this disease might
cause foreseeable emotional distress in the patient's homosexual cohabitant. A physician who is aware that the patient shares a spousal-like relationship with another reasonably should conclude that a misdiagnosis or
mistreatment of the often deadly syndrome would have a serious effect
upon the patient and the patient's homosexual cohabitant. In the event of
a negligent misdiagnosis or treatment, recovery for emotional distress by
the patient as well as the patient's homosexual cohabitant, therefore,
should be granted.275
Social policy concerns regarding the exposure of the defendant to unlimited liability may relieve the defendant of a duty of due care276 even in
this situation. Before the plaintiffs evidence of injury and causation is
weighed by the jury, the court must determine whether social policies
should preclude the plaintiff's right to a remedy.277 Despite an increasing
tolerance toward homosexuals, the court may choose to limit a defendant's duty of due care for negligent infliction of emotional distress to
those plaintiffs who share a more conventional relationship. A person's
sexual preference, however, should not bar a meritorious claim for emotional distress. A homosexual plaintiff who is able to overcome the burden
of proving serious emotional distress in a mental risk situation should be
allowed to recover.
CONCLUSION

Unmarried cohabitants are seeking to gain rights in areas that traditionally have been reserved for married couples. This author has considered the possibility of extending the right to state a claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress to unmarried cohabitants who share a stable and significant relationship. An analysis of the tort revealed that a defendant owes a duty of care to those persons who are reasonably
foreseeable victims of the defendant's tortious conduct. Thus, unmarried
cohabitants must prove that they come within the definition of foreseeable plaintiffs in order to recover for emotional distress.
The standard for determining foreseeability is dependent upon the type
274.
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of risk involved. 78 In a physical risk situation, a plaintiff who suffers emotional distress from witnessing another's injury must prove that the
mental distress resulted in physical harm.2 7 9 In addition, the plaintiff must
satisfy the three-pronged foreseeability test formulated in Dillon.28 This
test includes the requirement that the plaintiff share a substantially close
relationship with the primary victim.28 A review of subsequent case law
indicated that most courts have interpreted the close relationship requirement narrowly, granting recovery only when a spousal or blood relationship existed.282 Other courts have allowed recovery when evidence of a
family-like relationship has been established.283 This comment concluded
that spousal-like relationships also should satisfy the Dillonforeseeability
test.
The Molien decision governs the scope of the defendant's duty of due
care in a mental risk situation.284 This author noted that an unmarried cohabitant might be able to recover for mental injury in this situation because the plaintiff need not prove a physical injury nor a close relationship
with the other victim. 285 A defendant's duty, according to Molien, is determined by a reasonable person standard.286 Likewise, plaintiffs evidence
of injury and causation isjudged by a reasonable person standard.287
In either a physical risk or mental risk situation, a plaintiff may be denied relief for negligent infliction of emotional distress if prevailing social
policy limits the defendant's duty.288 An analysis of recent conflicting decisions affecting the rights of unmarried cohabitants to an action for loss
of consortium revealed that one court has held that the social policy
against extending this remedy to cohabitants is no longer valid. 289 By
analogy, this comment also concluded that similar social policy limitations should not preclude cohabitants from a remedy for negligent inflic290
tion of emotional distress.
The author further proposed that the right to a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress be extended to homosexual cohabitants who
share a significant and stable relationship.291 If the defendant owes a duty
of due care to unmarried cohabitants, then the sexual preference of the
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couple should not determine the merit of the claim.
MarjorieAlice Rasmussen

